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1. Introduction 
 
Areva and Electricité de France (EDF) are French-based companies at the heart of worldwide 
attempts to re-launch nuclear ordering – the so-called Nuclear Renaissance. Areva is an 
electricity industry equipment supplier offering transmission and distribution equipment as 
well as the full range of civil nuclear technologies. For its nuclear business, it operates as 
Areva NP, a joint venture with the German company Siemens in which Areva holds 66% and 
Siemens the balance, although in January 2009, Siemens announced it would be withdrawing 
from the joint venture (see below). EDF is an electric utility operating all the main generating 
technologies. The French state retains a majority holding in both companies although the 
priorities of their private shareholders, for EDF small shareholders and for Areva NP, 
Siemens, can no longer be ignored. In addition, the European Union law on unfair State Aids 
only allows governments to meet company losses or provide other assistance if such 
measures do not distort competition. For the markets Areva and EDF operate in, it would be 
hard to argue that any state aids did not distort competition. 
 
While neither company is exclusively a nuclear company, both have made major strategic 
moves in the past few years that make their future prospects more heavily dependent on the 
success of the Nuclear Renaissance. This strategy is based almost entirely on the design 
currently offered by Areva, the EPR - European Pressurised Water Reactor in Europe but 
Evolutionary Pressurised water Reactor in the USA - which is the only reactor technology 
commercially offered by Areva and which EDF is committed to use in all the new orders it is 
involved in. There is particular pressure on Areva NP to get EPR right as its previous design, 
N4, contained a number of design errors that meant operation was unreliable for the first 3-4 
years in service. Only four units were built, all in France and commissioned in the late 1990s 
before the design was superseded by EPR.1 
 
In this report, we examine these potential markets, the roles EDF and Areva are hoping to 
play in them and the prospects and risks to the two companies these markets offer. Two 
orders for the EPR are under construction, in Finland at the Olkiluoto site and in France at 
Flamanville. Both sites have experienced serious problems with construction and the 
Olkiluoto site is severely over time and budget. We examine, in particular, the direct financial 
consequences of these problems as well as the risks in their other potential markets. We don’t 
analyse in detail the risk to their reputation of problems at this site. In the long-term, this risk 
might be larger than the short-term direct financial risks, which can often be managed. 
 





• South Africa 
• Finland. 
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The Indian market may also emerge as an important market and France has signed a nuclear 
cooperation agreement with India, which envisages the sale of two EPRs and their fuel.2 
However, Indian plans, which foresee 10 units supplied from Russia and 4 from the USA as 
well as the French orders seem highly optimistic.3 
 
In section 2, we look at the nature of Areva and EDF’s businesses, including the scale and 
scope of their operation. In particular, we look at how their nuclear businesses fit into their 
overall strategy and what steps the French government is able to take to support them. In 
Section 3, we look at the key markets for EDF and for the nuclear division of Areva, while in 
Section 4, we look at the business prospects for the EDF’s and Areva’s nuclear ambitions, in 
particular, assessing how realistic sales and expansion targets are. Finally, in Section 5, we 
identify the main risks to the businesses of EDF and Areva. 
2. The nature of their businesses 
 
In this Section, we look at the scope and scale of EDF and Areva, in particular what factors 
influence their success or otherwise. Because of their close identification with the French 
government and its policy, we look at what scope theirs now is for the French government to 
provide assistance. 
 
While both companies are involved in the electricity business, they are very different in terms 
of their cash-flow and risk profiles. An electric utility, especially one as large as EDF 
generates a massive cash-flow. A reactor power plant of an EPR size generates income of 
about €600m per year. In a competitive market, the key to the success of an electric utility is, 
in the short-term, to ensure that generation costs, excluding capital charges, are always lower 
than the wholesale electricity price. In the long-term, the electricity sale price must also cover 
the capital charges. 
 
For nuclear plants, operating costs are generally seen as low compared to fossil fuel plants 
but it should be noted that British Energy collapsed in 2002 because its operating costs were 
higher than the price it was receiving for its power. Nuclear power is more problematic in this 
respect than fossil fuel stations because most of the nuclear costs are in the short-term fixed, 
whereas with a fossil fuel plant, the main cost is fuel, which is not incurred if the plant is not 
operated. By the standards of most products, demand for power is highly predictable, 
generally within 1% of forecast, thus in the past, there has been little demand risk. However, 
because of the huge cost of power stations, the cost of any over-forecasting of demand can be 
very high. In electricity markets that have been opened up to competition, demand risk 
becomes significant. There is little scope for product differentiation and brand loyalty for a 
standard product like electricity, so if an electric utility’s power is not competitively priced, 
market share should, in theory, fall very sharply unless the utility is able to sell at a loss. 
 
By contrast, an equipment vendor’s business depends more on receiving sufficient orders for 
its high fixed costs to be spread thinly and its facilities kept loaded. It must also control the 
costs of production of the equipment. An equipment supplier’s business is made up of the 
servicing requirement for supplied kit, which is reasonably predictable and smooth, and sales 
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of new equipment, which, particularly for large pieces of equipment could be extremely 
‘lumpy’ and not always predictable. Areva’s ‘front-end’ and ‘back-end’ services are 
reasonably smooth and predictable although the loss of a large contract could seriously 
impact on financial performance. 
 
Where the two companies’ interests can overlap is in the overall plant design and engineering 
areas. EDF has always carried out the design and architect engineering functions for the 
plants built in France. For the Olkiluoto order, Areva adopted an unaccustomed role as 
architect engineer and overall designer so that it had sufficient management control over the 
project to offer a turnkey contract. For orders that might be placed for UK, China, South 
Africa and USA, EDF would be much more deeply involved, for example, carrying out the 
overall plant design and managing the construction. 
 
2.1 EDF 
EDF was founded in 1946 as a fully state-owned company, formed mainly from the merger 
of former municipal companies, operating in electricity generation transmission and 
distribution. While there were a few small generation companies (for example, the 
nationalised coal company, Charbonnage de France) and some local authorities, such as 
Strasbourg, distributed electricity, it was an effective monopoly in all these activities. 
However, the European Union’s Electricity Directive of 1996, revised in 2003, forced France 
to at least nominally open the French electricity sector to competition in generation and retail. 
Even more so than most state-owned electricity companies, the French government has 
treated EDF as an arm of government and used it to implement the most ambitious nuclear 
programme in the world. It now operates 58 nuclear reactors, all of the Pressurised Water 
Reactor (PWR) type.4 
 
EDF is amongst the top five electric utilities in the world in terms of generating capacity 
owned, customers served, turnover etc. In November 2005, the French government sold 13.8 
per cent of the shares of EDF in an Initial Public Offering. 15% of the shares sold were 
allocated to employees, while the rest was sold to the market (retail and institutional 
investors).5 In 2007, the new Sarkozy French government sold a further 2.5 per cent of the 
shares, it claimed, to fund tertiary education. On December 31 2007, the French state owned 
84.85 per cent of the shares.6 Further share sales are expected. While the French government 
is required by law to retain at least 70 per cent of EDF’s shares, there is no reason to assume 
a future French government will not repeal this law. Even if further shares are not sold, EDF 
probably no longer has the scope to knowingly trade in a way that it makes losses any more. 
 
In the early 1990s, when the trend to privatise and liberalise electricity systems became 
important, EDF, along with a large number of US utilities, was one of the first and most 
prominent companies buying up foreign utilities. Its largest acquisitions were electricity 
distribution companies in Brazil (Light) and Argentina (Edenor). Of the other European 
electricity companies, only Endesa (Spain) and Tractebel (Belgium/France) made significant 
purchases outside Europe.7 
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By 2003, the US utilities had sold (or even abandoned) almost all their non-US assets, often 
losing large sums of money on them. EDF followed suit after making heavy losses in Brazil 
and Argentina, selling its stakes in all major assets outside Europe. This is reflected in the 
sharp fall in turnover in ‘rest of the world’ from 2005 to 2007 (see Table 2). Tables 1 to 3 
show that EDF’s business has grown slowly over the 3 years 2005-2007 with expansion in 
Europe more than compensating for the withdrawal from South America. From about 2000 
onwards, its main priority seemed to be to expand into other markets in Europe. The rationale 
for these moves seemed to be to concentrate on relatively predictable markets (markets 
within the European Union have to comply with the EU Electricity Directive) and in regions 
which connected directly with the French market.  
 
Table 1 Basic statistics on EDF 
 2005 2006 2007 
Sales (€bn) 51.0 58.9 59.6 
Of which in France (€bn) 30.0 31.9 32.2 
EBITDA 12.9 14.4 15.2 
Of which in France 8.5 9.3 10.0 
Employees (th) 162 156 159 
Of whom in France 108 107 105 
Generating capacity (GW) 131 128 127 
Of which in France (GW) 99 98 98 
Source: EDF Annual report and accounts 2006 and 20078 
 
Table 2 EDF sales/EBITDA9 (€m) by geographical area 
 2005 2006 2007 
France 30015 / 8544 32081 / 8893 32608 / 9996 
UK 6682 / 1306 8319 / 1268 8357 / 1285 
Germany 5005 / 905 6065 / 996 6925 / 1031 
Italy 2019 / 300 5615 / 928 4658 / 910 
Rest of Europe 4446 / 1193 5434 / 1363 6827 / 1655 
Rest of World 2880 / 658 2125 / 482 1270 / 333 
Total 51047 / 12906 58932 / 13930 59637 / 15210 
Source: EDF Annual report and accounts 2006 and 200710 
 
Table 3 EDF sales (€m) by activity11 
 Generation/supply12 Distribution13 Transmission14 Other15 Total 
France 20317 8551 3998 196 32232 
Rest of 
World 
21256 2126 16 4007 27405 
Total 41573 10677 4014 4203 59637 
Source: EDF Annual report and accounts 2006 and 200716 
 
EDF entered Germany from 2000 onwards taking a holding in EnBW, one of the four major 
German utilities. It entered UK in 1999 taking over London Electricity and subsequently 
other electricity industry companies and assets. It entered Italy by taking a stake in Edison in 
2001. It tried to take stakes in major companies in Sweden and Spain, but these attempts were 
either repelled or abandoned. As in Italy, EDF’s public ownership and the slowness of 
opening up of the French energy market led to resistance to it becoming a major presence in 
these markets. Since then it has built its stakes in EnBW and Edison and it has acquired other 
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UK assets (see below).17 This allows EDF to trade between regional/national markets, 
including Germany, UK, Italy and the Benelux countries. For the purposes of their nuclear 
strategy, the Italian and German holdings would seem to be of no relevance in the short-term 
given the existence of nuclear phase-out policies in both countries although if the policies in 
both these countries on phase-out were to be reversed, this would change. The new 
investments in the USA and UK discussed below are clearly not reflected yet in the financial 
figures. 
 
In terms of their business, generation and retail makes up about 70% of turnover and if EU 
rules on ‘unbundling’ (selling off the networks) are enforced rigorously, the other parts of the 
business, especially transmission, will decline further.18 
 
2.1.1 EDF’s financial position 
By the start of 2008, all EDF’s significant assets were in Europe. However, in the second half 
of 2008, there appeared to be a change in EDF’s priorities towards a much greater 
concentration on linking its expansion into markets where it could build new nuclear. Its 
2007 annual report states that the priority markets outside France are United States, China, 
UK and South Africa.19 EDF made two major acquisitions in the second half of 2008, one in 
the UK and one in the USA. It agreed the take-over of the privatised British nuclear 
generator, British Energy in September 2008 and it agreed to take over 49 per cent of the 
nuclear assets of the US utility, Constellation.20 These are major investments and their 
success is heavily dependent on prices in the wholesale electricity markets these nuclear 
plants sell into. If fossil fuel prices remain at the low level of early 2009 (oil less than 
US$40/barrel), wholesale electricity prices could fall leaving nuclear generators in 
difficulties, as happened in 2002 in the UK with British Energy.21 
 
In the past, EDF has always enjoyed access to cheap finance because its debts were fully 
backed by the French government so its credit rating was the same as that of the French 
government, which has always been Standard & Poor’s (S&P) highest rating, AAA. Now that 
EDF is partially privatised, this has changed and in December 2008 EDF was rated AA- for 
long-term debt and A-1+ for short-term debt, with a negative credit watch (i.e., the rating is 
likely to be lowered).22 
 
EDF’s results announced in February 2009 showed that the strain of these acquisitions is 
beginning to show.23 It announced it was expecting to sell assets to cut its debt, which had 
increased to €24.5bn at the end of 2008 from €16.3bn at the end of 2007.24 If the agreement 
to sell 25% of British Energy to Centrica is concluded, this should yield about €3.4bn. 
However, Chief Executive Officer Pierre Gadonneix said: 
‘We don’t exclude any component of our operations, in France or abroad,” for possible sale, 
Gadonneix said. “We want to negotiate the best prices, so I won’t be more precise.’ 
 
Reconciling its plans to build nuclear plants in the UK, USA and China as well as France 
with keeping its debt and credit rating under control will be difficult. 
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2.2 Areva 
The Areva Group was formed in 2001 from a merger of the French companies Framatome 
ANP, Cogema, FCI (Framatome Connectors International) and CEA Industrie, the nuclear 
energy division of the French Commissariat à l’Énergie Atomique (CEA; Atomic Energy 
Commission). Areva sold FCI in 2005 to focus on their energy business but in 2004, it took 
over the Transmission and Distribution division of Alstom.25 The Areva Group now consists 
of three main subsidiaries: Areva NP, Areva NC and Areva T&D. Of these, all are fully 
owned by Areva except for Areva NP, the nuclear power division which is a joint venture 
with Siemens which holds 34 per cent of the shares, although it announced its intention to 
withdraw from the joint venture in January 2009. Areva NC is the fuel services division, 
carrying out what it classifies in its reports as the front end and back end activities - uranium 
mining, conversion and enrichment, spent fuel reprocessing and recycling. 
 
The shareholding of Areva is complex but is totally dominated by the French state. The 
largest shareholders are the CEA (owned by the French government) with 79 per cent, the 
French state directly with 5 per cent, Caisse des Depots et Consignations (a publicly owned 
development bank) with 4 per cent, ERAP (a state-owned investment company) with 3 per 
cent and EDF 2 per cent.26 
 
Areva has seen a number of major changes in the past 5 years. In 2004, it took over the 
Transmission & Distribution equipment business of the French company Alstom. From 2007 
onwards, a number of further changes to its ownership and scope of business have been 
debated. One would be the part privatisation of Areva, a second would be a merger with 
Alstom, the French electrical engineering company, while a third would be for Bouygues, a 
French construction company to take a significant share in Areva. By end 2008, no decision 
on which option or combination of options would be taken.27 
 
2.2.1 Areva’s financial position 
In January 2009, Siemens announced it would exercise its option to withdraw from the Areva 
NP joint venture no later than 2012, although press reports suggest that Siemens was hoping 
for a much quicker exit, perhaps within a year.28 Standard & Poors said it expects the buyout 
of the Siemens’ stake in Areva NP to take about six months. Under the shareholding 
arrangement underpinning Areva NP, Areva has the option to oblige Siemens to sell its share 
as of January 2012, with three years' advance notice. Siemens has the reciprocal option to 
oblige Areva to buy it out – so-called ‘put’ and ‘call’ options. The value of Siemens’ ‘put’ is 
based on projections of future cash flows and was estimated in Areva’s mid-2008 financial 
accounts at €2.1bn. Areva will clearly argue that the losses made by the division in recent 
years mean the €2.1bn figure is too high, while Siemens will argue that future orders mean 
that a figure close to the 2008 valuation is appropriate. 
 
The withdrawal was not completely unexpected. Indeed, in 2007, the roles were reversed and 
the French government was reported to be looking for ways to remove Siemens from the joint 
venture.29 Siemens seems to have become frustrated at its lack of strategic influence on Areva 
NP – ‘lack of exercising entrepreneurial influence’.30 The negotiations on the terms of the 
withdrawal will be complex and a particular bone of contention will be how quickly Siemens 
is able to compete again in the nuclear market. Under the terms of the joint venture, the 
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agreement setting up Areva NP prohibits Siemens from competing against Areva NP for 
eight years in areas of business where Siemens brought technology or facilities to the joint 
firm.31 However, Siemens is reportedly in negotiations with the Russian nuclear vendor, 
Rosatom, to set up a joint venture and begin to compete against Areva NP in 5 years. 
 
The need to buy out Siemens’ stake will put considerable pressure on Areva’s finances and is 
likely to force the French government to clarify its intentions for Areva – whether it will 
introduce part-privatisation, a merger with Alstom or allow Bouygues to take a stake. The 
strain it will place was apparent in quotes made to the press. The Economist quoted one 
French nuclear executive as saying: ‘This is not the way you behave in business—normally 
you send signals.’32 Standard & Poors said Areva’s A-1 rating might be lowered to A-2 if 
Areva had to fully finance the buyout with new debt.33 
 
Overall, like EDF, Areva may need to sell assets to fund its ambitious expansion plans.34 
Possible divisions to sell are its Transmission & Distribution division and its 26.43% share in 
a mining company, Eramet. In summer 2008, its level of debt was about €4.5bn and Areva 
was reluctant to take on more debt. However, it will need €10bn to finance its investment 
needs over the next four years as well as about €2bn to buy Siemens out of Areva NP. 
 
2.2.2 Areva’s businesses 
Tables 4, 5 and 6 (see below) show that from 2005 onwards Areva has expanded its turnover, 
profit and number of employees. This expansion has come in all four of its main divisions 
except ‘Back end’ fuel services which have declined in turnover terms. By contrast, their 
‘Front end’ and ‘Back end’ businesses are by far the most profitable parts of their business, 
while the profitability of the ‘Reactors & services’ division is consistently poor and, in 2007, 
it made a loss. The very poor figures on profitability for ‘Reactors and services’ are likely to 
reflect write-offs on the Olkiluoto contract. In its 2006 annual report, Areva added €452m to 
its ‘provisions for losses to completion’. Areva stated that35: ‘The provision recognized by the 
group in 2006 reflects the increase in costs and contingencies for this project [Olkiluoto].’ In 
its 2007 annual report, it added further provisions of €361m to ‘provisions for losses to 
completion’, stating that36: ‘(t)his heading primarily includes losses to completion related to 
the OL3 [Olkiluoto] EPR construction contract.’ Without these provisions, the profitability of 
this division would have been comparable to that of the other major divisions (see later for 
more detailed analysis). Standard &Poors gave Areva a credit rating for the first time in 
December 2008, when it gave it A-1, the second highest category, although the subsequent 
announcement by Siemens of its intention to withdraw from Areva NP has put this rating in 
doubt.37 
 
Table 7 shows that about half of Areva’s employees are based in France still but the 




Table 4 Areva profile 
 2005 2006 2007 
Sales (€m) 10,125 10,863 11,923 
EBITDA (€m) 1,117 1,293 1,335 
Employees (th) 59 61 66 
Source: Areva Reference document 2006 and 2007. 38 
 
Table 5 Turnover / EBITDA by division - €m 
 2005 2006 2007 
Front end 2631 / 508 2919 / 630 3140 / 731 
Reactors & services 2348 / 173 2312 / 7 2717 / (125) 
Back end 1921 / 483 1908 / 443 1738 / 440 
Transmission & distribution 3212 / 106 3724 / 258 4327 / 426  
Other39 14 / (53) 0 / (46) 1 / (137) 
Total  10, 125/ 1217 10863 / 1293 11923 / 1335 
Source: Areva Reference document 2006 and 2007. 40 
Note: Figures in brackets denote losses. 
 
Table 6 Areva employees by activity 
 2005 2006 2007 
Front End 11,047 11,995 12,577 
Reactors and Services 14,323 14,936 16,500 
Back End 10,864 10,697 10,638 
Transmission & distribution 22,094 22,988 25,248 
Other 432 495 620 
Total 58,760 61,111 65,583 
Source: Areva Reference document 2006 and 2007. 41 
 
Table 7 Areva employees by location 
 2005 2006 2007 
France 31, 194 31,240 32,224 
Europe (exc. France) 12,085 13,456 14,556 
North & South America 7,912 7,497 8,717 
Africa & Middle East 1,745 2,519 2,638 
Asia-Pacific 5,824 6,417 7,448 
Total 58,760 61,111 65,583 
Source: Areva Reference document 2006 and 2007. 42 
 
Table 8 Areva turnover by region and activity (€m / 2007/2006 change in %)) 
 France Europe (exc 
France 
N & S 
America 
Asia Pacific Africa & M 
East  
Total 
Front End 1108 / (15.4) 779/ 10.0 678 / 5.4 631 / 91.2 34 / (2.9) 3140 / 7.5  
Reactors  & 
Services 
946 / 6.8 814 / 18.5 638 / 22.2 238 / 30.1 81 / 138.2 2717 / 17.5 
Back End 1000 / (11.1) 341 / (30.1) 86 / 10.3 310 / 44.2 1 /  1738 / (8.9) 
Transmission & 
distribution 
348 / 10.1 1473 / 15.2 570 / (5.5) 1052 / 28.9 884 / 24.9 4327 / 16.2 
Total 3313 / (6.1) 3407 / 7.7 1972 / 6.8 2231 / 44.4 1000 / 28.5 11923 / 9.8 
Source: Areva Reference document 2006 and 2007. 43 
Note: Figures in brackets denote losses. 
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If we examine turnover by region and activity (see Table 8), we can see that in France, the 
‘Front end’ and ‘Back end’ activities declined sharply in 2007, but France is still Areva’s 
largest market for ‘Reactors and services’. The ‘Transmission & distribution’ business is 
small in France. In the rest of Europe, the ‘Back end’ business is declining sharply as 
countries withdraw from spent fuel reprocessing. All other businesses are growing strongly. 
North & South America is still a relatively small part of the business but ‘Reactors & 
services’ is growing strongly there reflecting Areva’s move into the US reactor servicing 
market. Asia Pacific is growing very strongly in all sectors, while Africa & Middle East is 
also growing strongly in ‘Transmission & distribution’ and ‘Reactors & services’ (albeit from 
a very low base for the latter). 
2.2.3 Reactor services division 
If we focus on the Reactor & Services, which contributes 23% of Areva’s turnover, the 
division is further divided into 7 business units (see Table 9): 
• Plants: design, construction and engineering of nuclear power plants; 
• Equipment: design and fabrication of nuclear power plant components; 
• Nuclear Services: maintenance, inspection and servicing of nuclear power plants; 
• AREVA TA: design and fabrication of naval propulsion reactors and complex 
systems with a high level of safety; 
• Nuclear Measurement: design and fabrication of nuclear measurement 
instrumentation; 
• Consulting and Information Systems: consulting, systems integration and MIS 
outsourcing; 
• Renewable Energies. 
 
Table 9 Reactor services revenue by activity (€m) 
 2007 2006 
Plants business unit 1053 741 
Equipment business unit 215 251 
Nuclear Services 791 644 
AREVA TA 308 314 
Nuclear Measurement 159 175 
Consulting & Information Systems 157 156 
Renewable Energies 35 32 
Total 2718 2313 
Source: Areva Reference document 2006 and 2007. 44 
 
The ‘Plants’ and ‘Equipment’ business units are the most volatile, depending most on new 
orders for plants. However, even in the ‘Plants’ division, in 2006, ‘recurring business’, that is 
work on operating reactors such as designing new instrumentation systems, accounted for 
nearly two thirds of the ‘Plants’ business turnover. Areva expects this proportion to fall as 
new orders are placed, but even this division has a continuing base-line of work not 
dependent on new orders. Further, the ‘Equipment’ division receives orders from the ‘Plants’ 
division and most of the equipment it supplies, like pressure vessels, are not replaceable, so 
recurring orders are a smaller proportion of the business, although replacement steam 
generators do represent a useful flow of orders (EDF is opening this market up to competition 
so Areva is not guaranteed this business). There is a capacity shortage for many of these 
major components, for example, the forgings for pressure vessels and Areva could supply 
material for other reactor vendors. Thus, it should be a profitable business if ordering of new 
reactors does take off, at least until the capacity shortage is overcome. Finally, the ‘Nuclear 
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services’ business unit’s business is dominated by work on existing reactors and therefore 
represents a relatively stable market, albeit a highly competitive one, with a number of 
specialist service companies competing against the main vendors. 
 
Overall, Areva’s ‘Reactor services’ is not reliant on new orders. There is a large flow of work 
from existing reactors. In the past, vendors have been able to dominate the market on reactors 
they have sold for this ‘recurring’ work and this work has been very profitable, perhaps even 
justifying selling plant on ‘loss-leader’ terms. However, these markets are now highly 
competitive with vendors bidding to work on other vendors’ plants and specialist companies. 
So the potential market has expanded, but its profitability and the riskiness of the market have 
increased. 
 
Areva lists its existing and potential markets for new reactors as France, Finland and China 
(existing) and USA, UK, and South Africa for potential orders.45 It also lists Bulgaria, but 
this work would involve completing a part-built Russian designed plant, so this market is not 
considered here. The South African utility, Eskom, abandoned plans to order 2 EPRs in 
December 200846, so this market is also not considered further. 
 
2.3 The French Government 
The French government is not able to support Areva and EDF to the same extent as in the 
past. The EU’s Electricity Directive opens electricity markets to competition so EDF can no 
longer plan the entire French electricity generation sector. EU competition law also restricts 
the extent to which governments can subsidise their companies. In theory, if state assistance 
was sufficient to improve their competitive position, this would be regarded by the European 
Commission as ‘unfair’ state aid because it would distort markets.47 The Commission’s 
approval of the Olkiluoto guarantees is all the more inexplicable in this light. 
 
The main area where the French government can still provide assistance, especially outside 
the EU, is through export credit guarantees from its agency Coface. Coface gave export 
credits to the Olkiluoto order. These were challenged by Greenpeace and EREF (see below) 
but the European Commission found on rather dubious grounds, that this did not constitute 
‘unfair state aid’.48 Coface said in August 2008 that it was preparing to issue preliminary 
agreement to insure financing of two Areva EPRs at Taishan in China's Guangdong province 
(see below)49. At the same time, Coface announced an agreement to insure financing for two 
EPRs that could be built in South Africa. The extent of the guarantees Coface would supply 
was not disclosed but after the collapse of the South African tender, Areva claimed it would 
be able to cover 85 percent of the cost from OECD export credit agencies.50 The report did 
not specify which apart from Coface would participate. Without these guarantees, finance 
would be much more difficult to arrange, particularly for developing country markets. Areva 
does not have the financial scope to offer finance, while EDF would be able to offer some 
finance if it took an equity stake in the new plants, as it is doing in UK, USA and China. 
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3. EDF and Areva’s key markets 
 
In this section we examine in detail the markets EDF and Areva have targeted for their 
nuclear businesses. We examine what investments they have made and what the prospects 
and risks are that their strategy entails. 
 
3.1 France 
France remains the key market for both EDF and Areva. France’s 58 PWRs (63GW), all 
owned by EDF51 were brought into service mainly in the period 1977-1992, when they were 
expected to have an operating life of 40 years. These provide Areva with a flow of reasonably 
assured servicing work, that no other vendor can match. The strategic importance of the EPR 
to EDF was therefore to have a proven technology that was available to replace the existing 
plants. Simply to replace these plants as they were retired would have required the 
completion of about 2-3 EPRs per year from 2017 onwards.52 The Olkiluoto order of 2004 
was therefore a useful first step in gaining experience with the EPR, while the Flamanville 
order placed by EDF in 2007 gave EDF some first-hand experience with the technology so 
that when regular orders were needed, EDF would have the right skills available. 
 
In practice, a number of factors mean this steady flow of orders for EPRs by EDF in France 
might not materialise: 
• There is now an expectation that PWRs will be licensable for 60 years so the main 
replacement need would not materialise until after 2030; 
• EDF no longer has a monopoly in France and the merger of GDF (the publicly 
controlled gas company) with Suez (whose main business is the dominant Belgian 
electric utility, Electrabel) means that some form of competition to EDF will emerge. 
This will mean that EDF cannot centrally plan the French electricity system: it will be 
subject to market forces; 
• There is already over-capacity in nuclear power in France, which means the existing 
plants cannot always easily be fully utilised. 
These factors mean that the demand for new generating capacity to replace old PWRs is 
unlikely to arise and it cannot be assumed that any new capacity needed will be chosen and 
built by EDF. 
 
3.1.1 EDF in France 
Life extension 
While EDF has, for more than a decade, wanted to establish the EPR as a commercial 
technology, in the past 3-4 years, a number of factors mean that the priority to order plants to 
start to replace the existing nuclear plants may be less. 
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In the USA, the regulatory case to allow PWRs to be licensed to operate for up to 60 years 
instead of the original assumption of 40 years is now well-established. Whether PWRs can 
actually operate for 60 years is not proven given that the oldest operating PWR worldwide is 
still only 40 years old. Unlike the USA, the French regulator does not license plants for a 
specific period but licensing is renewed every 10 years. French operators must instead 
demonstrate to safety authorities every 10 years that each unit is safe to continue to operate 
for the next decade. The first two units will undergo their 30-year inspections in 2009 (the 
process is running a little late). 
 
The original EDF assumption was that the plants would operate for 40 years or less, so, 
assuming a 5-6 year construction period, construction on the replacement plants would have 
had to start around 2010. However, in December 2008, EDF expressed its intention to operate 
its 900MW units (34 units completed between 1977 and 1990) for up to 60 years. The Chief 
Financial Officer, Daniel Camus, said all EDF’s “focus, and all our maintenance work, is 
dedicated to operating the reactors past the 40-year mark.”, and “we will never promise to get 
to 60 years, but we will commit to do everything to get from 40 to 50, and from 50 to 60 
years.”53 
 
There would be huge logistical benefits of not having to find and gain approval for new 
reactor sites and not having to manage a large number of construction projects. Not having to 
build new plants would also avoid exacerbating the severe international shortage of nuclear 
skills. EDF also faces an uncertain role in the French market, unless the spirit of the European 
Union’s Electricity Directive, which requires that national electricity generation monopolies 
are replaced by a single competitive European electricity market, can be ignored. EDF will 
have to dramatically reduce its generation market share in France. In such a situation, 
building new generation capacity would be extremely risky and would be seen as politically 
provocative. One alternative would be to build plants in collaboration with other utilities, as it 
is doing with ENEL at the Flamanville plant (see below). Suez GDF, which has limited 
experience in building nuclear power plants and would like to expand its French electricity 
business, might also be a suitable partner. The company already has stakes in two EDF sites, 
Tricastin and Chooz (1100MW) and competed with ENEL to take a stake in Flamanville.54 
 
In July 2008, President Sarkozy announced that a second EPR would be built in France at a 
site yet to be identified.55 Subsequently, Sarkozy specified the site would be Penly and EDF 
would be the majority owner with GDF taking a minority share.56 GDF would build the third 
unit. Construction was forecast to start in 2011.57 
 
There would also be huge financial pay-offs to EDF if the lives of its existing plants could be 
extended to 60 years. EDF assumes that a maintenance and upgrade expenditure of €400m 
per reactor and using this figure, EDF calculated that the net value of extending all 34 
900MW reactors to 60 years would be about €40bn.58 
 
There would be particular financial benefits for decommissioning funds. The Planning Act on 
Sustainable Management of Radioactive Materials and Waste (Birraux Act) of 2006 required 
that EDF must clearly identify and segregate assets that will pay for waste disposal, spent fuel 
processing and decommissioning.59 Previously EDF had made accounting provisions for 
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these activities but the provisions were not separated or identified and, in effect, EDF could 
use these funds to fund its international expansion and its national investment needs. At the 
end of 2006, the dedicated assets were worth €6bn. EDF then expected it would have 
identified assets backing its entire projected nuclear liabilities of about €16bn by the end of 
2010 (see Table 10). 
 
Table 10  Provisions for back-end activities - €m 
 2005 2006 2007 
Provisions for decommissioning& last core 13136 13824 13654 
Provisions to cover the back-end of the fuel cycle 14752 15381 17455 
Source: EDF Consolidated Financial Statements, 2006 and 2007.60 
 
The discounted liability for decommissioning (using a 3% real interest rate) was estimated at 
about €13bn or about €250m per reactor.61 This seems a very low figure and if the figure 
turns out to be significantly more, the additional operating life would allow a further 20 years 
to collect funds and it would also allow the provisions to grow from the interest the funds 
accrue. EDF is allowed to assume that provisions grow in real terms (net of inflation) at 3% 
per year62, which over 20 years, would add 80% to the funds. 
 
While life extension would make financial sense to EDF, it would leave the programme of 
French EPR orders in tatters. If the plan to extend lives to 60 years was successful, there 
would be no need for substantial ordering for France before about 2030. By this time, the 
EPR design would most likely have needed, as a minimum, major modifications to maintain 
licensability. It may be that one of the rationales for EDF’s aggressive move into 
international markets is the need to generate a sufficient flow of orders for the EPR to keep it 
a viable option for the home market. 
Flamanville 3 
The Olkiluoto order for an EPR, decided in 2003 and placed in 2004, was a major advantage 
to EDF. It allowed the EPR design to be demonstrated in practice without EDF having to 
build unwanted capacity. Apart from delaying the time when investment from EDF was 
needed it also allowed someone else to have to deal with the inevitable ‘first-of-a-kind’ 
problems. However, when the EPR received final design approval from the French regulator, 
DGSNR, in 2004, EDF decided to test the technology with one order for the Flamanville 
site63 where two 1300MW plans were already in operation. The reactor was formally ordered 
in 2006 and work on the site began in December 2007.  
 
EDF’s estimated construction cost and construction time were somewhat higher than those 
adopted for Olkiluoto. In March 2006, it emerged that EDF expected the second EPR order, 
for its Flamanville site, to cost €3.3bn, 10% more than the contracted Olkiluoto price) and 
that the lead-time would be 54 months instead of the 48 month period forecast for 
Olkiluoto.64 However, unlike the Olkiluoto contract, this cost does not include the cost of the 
first fuel load (conventionally included in the cost of a nuclear plant), while the Olkiluoto 
price includes interest during construction.65 The very low interest rate applied at Olkiluoto 
means that in this case, interest during construction will be low.66 So the difference between 
the Olkiluoto price and the Flamanville price is larger than the headline figures suggest. 
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ENEL, the largest Italian electric utility has taken a 12.5% stake in Flamanville 3 and will 
contribute proportionately to the finance. The 2007 EDF Annual Report states: 
“On November 30, 2007, EDF and Enel signed a strategic partnership agreement, under which 
Enel bears a 12.5% share in all construction, operation, decommissioning and back-end nuclear 
cycle management expenses for the Flamanville 3 EPR-type nuclear plant, in return for access to 
12.5% of the electricity generated by the EPR over its lifetime. The plant’s nuclear operator is 
EDF, which bears full responsibility for its operations. The partnership agreement also gives Enel 
the option of progressively acquiring the electricity generated by EDF’s nuclear plants, up to a 
total capacity of 1,200 MW.”67 
And: 
“Enel also has an option, until 2023, to take a 12.5% stake under similar terms in the five potential 
EPR projects likely to be implemented by EDF in France up to that date.”68 
One important difference between Flamanville and Olkiluoto was that Olkiluoto was a full 
turn-key contract between Areva NP and Olkiluoto’s owner, TVO. This means that the plant 
construction was fully managed by Areva NP and the price was fixed at the level in the 
contract. This was a route EDF has never followed as it has always carried out the ‘architect 
engineering’. For Flamanville 3, Areva is supplying the nuclear island, Alstom the turbine 
generator, Bouygues, the civil works and EDF itself the architect engineering. 
 
In May 2008, the French safety regulatory authorities temporarily halted construction because 
of quality issues in pouring the concrete base mat.69 Delays had led the vendor, Areva NP to 
forecast that the plant would not be completed until 2013, a year late. However, in November 
2008, EDF claimed that the delays could be made up without major changes to working 
patterns and that it had learnt from these early errors.70  
 
EDF's civil works contractor Bouygues encountered major delays in 2008 in attempting to 
excavate the discharge channel at Flamanville-3 with explosives, due to denser-than-
anticipated granite. This was overcome by using a tunnel boring machine at an extra cost of 
€40m.71 EDF did acknowledge that the expected construction costs for Flamanville had 
increased from €3.3 billion to €4 billion.72 Inflation and technical and regulatory changes 
were blamed by EDF for the bulk of the 20% cost overrun on the overnight cost of 
Flamanville. Higher prices for commodities and labor since the previous cost projection 
accounted for a smaller percentage of the re-evaluation. Nucleonics Week reported that: 
 
“Inflation accounted for an 8% rise above the 2005 estimate, or about €250m in 2008 €, resulting 
in a base figure of €3.55bn. About €150m was added to that for price re-evaluations, notably for 
raw materials (copper, nickel, and titanium), steel and labor. Part of that rise was due to revision of 
indexed prices under early contracts, and another part to higher-than-anticipated prices for the 20% 
of Flamanville-3 contracts EDF has concluded since 2005. Those revisions brought the cost to 
€3.7bn. Mathias [EDF CEO] said the cost of solving technical problems, meeting new safety 
regulations, and increasing contingency reserves added another €300m, or about another 8%, 
bringing the new total to €4bn.”73 
Flamanville costs were reported to be inflated because it, rather than Olkiluoto, bore first-of-
a-kind (FOAK) costs including development and design engineering costs.74 EDF has not 
specified the extent of FOAK costs at Flamanville 3, but in the past it has estimated that the 
cost of a FOAK can be double that of a series unit assuming a series of at least 10 units.75 
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However, EDF has stated that a second EPR in France would still be more expensive. There 
would be no series effect until at least three or four units had been built.76 EDF claimed there 
would be savings on construction costs thanks to the learning from Flamanville-3, but those 
savings would be offset by a tighter market for materials and equipment than when EDF 
placed the Flamanville contracts in 2004 and 2005.77 
Impact of delays and cost overruns on EDF 
EDF is in a unique position worldwide in having more nuclear capacity in France than it can 
use. As a result, it has had to reduce the output from some of its nuclear plants at times of low 
electricity demand and it has even had to bring back into service a 700MW oil-fired unit, 
closed for 12 years because it needed peaking capacity that the nuclear units cannot supply. It 
is therefore far from clear how the output of Flamanville could be used. At periods of low 
demand, it is likely to simply substitute for other nuclear plants, while for the rest of the year 
it would substitute for fossil fuel plants. Whether the savings from substituting for fossil fuel 
plants would counterbalance the extra nuclear running costs for Flamanville 3 is hard to 
determine without access to details of EDF’s cost structure. Also, whether the available extra 
output could be sold to export markets profitably is difficult to determine. The impact of a 
delay in completing the plant might be quite limited because of the over-capacity that EDF 
has. 
 
EDF’s tariffs for its residential consumers are still regulated and how much it could recover 
of any additional costs would ultimately be the decision of the French government – the 
Regulatory body, CRE, provides advice to the government but the government is not obliged 
to accept this advice. Similarly, if the costs of Flamanville were to overrun, it would be a 
decision for the government/regulator whether EDF would be forced to take this extra cost 
out of its profits. If the extra cost was 50% or about €2bn, it was forced to take this from 
profits and it wrote the extra cost off over several years, the impact on its overall profits 
would be quite small given that EDF’s profits are more than €15bn per year. 
 
3.1.2 Areva in France 
For Areva, the French market is crucial for its EPR business. If there is no flow of orders 
from France, it will be very difficult to generate sufficient export orders to keep the business 
viable. So the decision on life-extension is of central importance. If the life of the existing 
PWRs is extended to 60 years, there will be no substantial ordering for the French market 
until 2030, by which time the EPR is highly unlikely to be a commercial design. 
 
For the Flamanville plant, the impact of any cost or time overruns would be largely indirect 
provided it can supply the equipment it is contracted for at the contract price. In practice, 
nuclear cost escalation occurs either because of design changes or because of on-site 
problems. For the Flamanville plant, Areva is not responsible for any on-site problems, it is 
simply an equipment supplier. The indirect impact of significant problems at Flamanville, in 
terms of the damage to its reputation of major problems at both of the European EPR sites 
would be much greater. 
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3.2 Finland 
3.2.1 Areva in Finland 
The Finnish electricity industry had been trying to get Parliamentary approval for a fifth 
nuclear unit since 1992 and finally succeeded in 2002. The Olkiluoto order, placed in 2004, 
was a huge boost for the nuclear industry in general and the vendor, Areva NP, in particular. 
The benefits for EDF were indirect however and EDF has had no part to play in the 
construction of the plant. When complete it will provide a demonstration and reference to 
other prospective buyers for the EPR. Equally significantly, the Olkiluoto order seemed to 
show that nuclear power orders were possible in competitive electricity markets. Finland is 
part of what is generally seen as the most competitive electricity market in the world, the 
Nordic market covering Norway, Sweden, Finland and Denmark. Finland also has a very 
high reputation for the operation of the 4 units that it owns. 
The contract terms 
The details of how the plant would be financed have not been published, but the European 
Renewable Energies Federation (EREF) and Greenpeace separately made complaints to the 
European Commission in December 2004 that they contravened European State aid 
regulations.78 The Commission did not begin to investigate the complaints until October 2006 
and, in September 2007, the European Commission Competition authorities dropped the 
case.79 According to EREF, the Bayerische Landesbank (BLB, owned by the state of Bavaria) 
led the syndicate (with Handelsbanken, Nordea, BNP Paribas and J P Morgan) that provided 
the majority of the finance. It provided a loan of €1.95 billion, about 60 percent of the total 
cost at a remarkably low interest rate of 2.6 percent.80  
 
Two export credit institutions are also involved: France’s Coface, with a €610 million export 
credit guarantee covering Areva supplies, and the Swedish Export Agency SEK for €110 
million.81 Again, this is a surprising feature as export credit guarantees are usually offered 
only for exports to developing countries with unstable economies, not a category that Finland 
falls into. 
 
The buyer Teollisuuden Voima Oy (TVO) is an organization unique to Finland. Pohjolan 
Voima Oy (PVO), the largest shareholder holds 60 percent of TVO’s shares. PVO is a not-
for-profit company owned by Finnish electric-intensive industry that generates about 15 
percent of Finland’s electricity. Its shareholders are entitled to purchase electricity at cost in 
proportion to the size of their equity stakes. In return, they are obliged to pay fixed costs 
according to the percentage of their stakes and variable costs in proportion to the volume of 
electricity they consume. The other main shareholder in TVO is the largest Finnish electricity 
company, Fortum, with 25 percent of the shares. The majority of shares in Fortum are owned 
by the Finnish Government.82 This arrangement is therefore effectively a contract for the 
output of Olkiluoto 3 over the full life of the plant at prices set to fully cover what ever costs 
are incurred. 
 
Overall then, the economic risks of building this plant were borne by consumers, through the 
cost-plus terms of the contract, French (and Swedish) taxpayers through the credit guarantees 
and the vendor, Areva NP (majority owned by the French public), through the turnkey 
contract. 
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Experience at Olkiluoto 
From the start in 2005, the construction period at Olkiluoto went seriously wrong, so that 
after three years of construction, in November 2008, the plant was three years behind 
schedule and the vendor, Areva, was suffering severe losses.83 This was not the result of a 
particular problem but the result of a range of failures including: welding, delays in detailed 
designs, problems with concrete and with the quality of some equipment. More generally, it 
seemed that none of the parties involved including the vendor, the customer, or the safety 
regulator had a clear enough understanding of the requirements building a nuclear plant 
placed on them. 
 
In December 2006, the French Ministry of Industry (the French government owns more than 
90 percent of Areva) said that the losses to Areva had reached €700 million on a contract 
fixed at €3 billion.84 The turnkey contract was widely seen as placing all the risk of cost-
escalation on Areva NP. However, even before substantial work had been carried out, Areva 
acknowledged the price was not as fixed as it was portrayed as being. Bertrand Durrande, an 
executive vice president at Areva NP said that “even a turnkey contract doesn't guarantee that 
a customer won't pay a penny more.”85 He explained that the contract with TVO covered a 
certain scope for which ‘there's a fixed price’ in the original contract. But, Durrande said, 
“when you reach the construction phase, there are always a certain number of discussions 
because one or both parties realize that the original contract doesn't cover everything, or that 
some things must be changed.”86 
 
A year later, the strains inherent in a turnkey contract for such a complicated order were 
becoming apparent. Philippe Knoche, an Areva NP representative stated, “Areva-Siemens 
cannot accept 100 percent compensation responsibility, because the project is one of vast co-
operation. The building site is joint so we absolutely deny 100 percent compensation 
principle.”87 TVO did not accept this interpretation and the TVO project manager, Martin 
Landtman, when asked about Knoche’s statement said, “I don’t believe that Areva says this. 
The site is in the contractor’s hands at the moment. Of course, in the end, TVO is responsible 
of what happens at the site. But the realization of the project is Areva’s responsibility.”88 It 
may well be that this dispute will have to be settled in court. 
 
On the finance side, the leader of the syndicate of banks, BLB, had to be rescued by the 
German government. In November 2008, it received the first installment of guarantees from 
the German government for €15 billion.89 If this is sufficient to stabilize the bank’s finances, 
the loan to TVO should not be affected. 
 
Compensation for delays has already reached the limit of €300 million that would be payable 
for a delay of 18 months. TVO will not receive compensation for further delays beyond those 
already incurred by September 2006. The possibility that the cost of buying the power 
Olkiluoto was expected to produce during the years 2009-12 from the Nordic market might 
be so high as to cause TVO to default can no longer be ignored. TVO will have to buy power 
from the Nordic electricity wholesale market for at least three years. Generating capacity is 
getting tight in the Nordic market and because the system is dependent on hydro-electricity, it 
is vulnerable to dry winters, which in the past few years have led to wholesale prices 
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increasing up to five-fold. For the energy intensive consumers that make up PVO’s customer 
base, high and volatile electricity prices are intolerable. 
 
In December 2008, TVO announced that the Areva-Siemens consortium that was supplying 
the plant had filed a request for arbitration concerning the delay and related costs. Its press 
release stated: 
”The request relates to a claim presented previously by the consortium to TVO, which TVO has 
studied and found to be without merit. Understandably, TVO will carefully study the 
documentation now presented and will respond to it. As stated by TVO in its interim review of 
January - June 2008, TVO has earlier claimed for compensation from the plant supplier for losses 
and costs incurred due to the delay to the project.”90 
 
The outcome of the arbitration case is not predictable and the most recent estimates of the 
cost overrun were more than a year old in December 2008 and ranged from €0.5-1.5bn.91 In 
March 2008, Nucleonics Week reported: 
“Areva said it did not record further provisions against potential losses on OL3 in second-half 
2007, and Lauvergeon continued to decline to identify the amounts recorded in 2006 and first-half 
2007. Analysts have estimated those provisions at €700m, but some estimates put the potential loss 
at completion of the project at €1.5bn.” 92: 
 
Subsequently, in September 2008 Areva NP reported an operating loss of €258m in the first 
half of 2008, after the company made new, unspecified provisions for Olkiluoto. Despite this, 
Standard & Poors gave Areva a high credit rating in December 2008. It said it did not expect 
lasting negative impacts from the Olkiluoto nor did they expect Siemens to exercise its ‘put 
option’ to sell its 34% stake in Areva NP.93 This latter prediction was quickly proved 
incorrect (see above) and Areva’s credit rating might fall from A-1 to A-2. Siemens did 
announce charges of €344m for the Olkiluoto deal in its 2008 annual report94. This was in 
addition to earlier provisions, which it had declined to quantify. 
 
The Finnish press reported in December 2008 that Areva had announced that it was not 
interested in future nuclear power projects in Finland.95 
 
The question that is so far unanswered from the Olkiluoto experience is whether this is an 
isolated failure or whether it is a demonstration that the old problems of unpredictable 
construction costs and times have not been solved. 
Further orders 
Despite the problems with Olkiluoto 3, three utilities have announced they would like to 
build a further nuclear unit in Finland. First, TVO has announced it would like to build a 
fourth unit at the Olkiluoto site. It has already completed an Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA) which claimed a new unit of 1000-1800MW could be online in 2018, 
which implies ordering in about 201296. However, no decision has been taken on the vendor 
and the EIA identified nine possible designs (including EPR). 
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Second, Fortum has announced it would like to build a new unit at the Loviisa site where two 
Russian designed plants are in operation. Fortum submitted an EIA for this site in April 
200897. As with Olkiluoto 4, no reactor type or vendor has been identified yet, but 
construction was forecast to start in 2012 with completion in 2018. 
 
The third possible developer, Fennovoima, a consortium of about 60 Finnish companies, 
including electric utilities, is examining four sites and submitted an EIA in January 2008.98 In 
January 2009, Fennovoima applied to the Ministry of Employment and the Economy for a 
decision in principle on the project. Fennovoima expects to bring a new plant (one or two 
units) of 1500-2500MW on line in 202099. It has identified Westinghouse/Toshiba and Areva 
as the two most likely vendors. 
 
The Minister for Economic Affairs, Mauri Pekkarinen, has said that Finland would only need 
one new reactor by 2020. The Finnish government expects to make a decision in early 
2010.100 
 
How far these applications are seen as complimentary and how far they are seen as 
competing is difficult to say, but it is difficult to see how Finland could accommodate the 
output of three new units of, say, 1700MW, increasing Finland’s installed capacity by about 
50% unless much of the output was exported (this would need substantial new transmission 
capacity).  
Risks to Areva of Olkiluoto 
The direct consequences of cost overruns, unless a large proportion can be passed on to the 
customer will make a significant impression on Areva’s profits. Areva has already written off 
about €800m so this amount has no more impact on Areva. The profitability of the ‘Reactors 
and services’ division has been well below that of the other divisions in 2006 and 2007 but 
these other divisions are large enough that Areva remained a profitable company in those 
years. If it can phase any further losses over the next 3 years, the impact should be relatively 
small. The indirect consequences are likely to be much higher. Olkiluoto was supposed to be 
the showcase for EPR technology and for it to have gone so badly wrong is severe blow to its 
reputation. Even more damaging is the spectacle of Areva suing its customer and this may 
harm its chances if a further reactor order for Finland is approved. 
 
3.3 UK 
3.3.1 EDF in UK 
EDF entered UK in 1999 with the purchase of London Electricity (see above), a distribution 
and retail electricity company with a small amount of generating capacity. Subsequently it 
bought the retail businesses of two more of the previous 12 regional retail companies of 
England and Wales (South West and South East) and two more of the distribution (‘wires’) 
businesses (Eastern and South East). EDF also bought coal (4000MW) and gas fired 
(800MW) capacity so that by 2007, it owned 4.9GW of generation.101 This makes EDF the 
largest distributor of electricity in the UK (with 7.9m consumers) but only the 5th largest 
retailer (with 5.5m consumers), although the market shares of the 6 big retailers are 
reasonably comparable.102 EDF is a relatively small generator producing only 25.4TWh in 
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2007, all allocated to its residential and SME customers.103 It buys the rest of its 
requirements, for its industrial consumers, from the market and from the 2000MW 
interconnector to France. This policy of covering its sales to residential and SME customers 
from its own plants, buying the rest of its needs from the market is a policy largely followed 
by the other 5 large generator/retail companies in Britain. The industrial consumer ‘market’ is 
supplied to a significant extent by the nuclear capacity owned by British Energy (10.7GW). 
 
Table 11 EDF in UK 
 2007 (% change from 2006) 
Sales (£m) 5744 (1.2) 
Of which electricity (£m) 3895 (-2.6) 
Profit before tax (£m) 342 (-15.6) 
Electricity sales (GWh) 52435 (-1.9) 
Number of retail customers (th) 5539 (+0.8) 
Generating capacity (GW) 4.9 (0) 
Source: EDF Energy (2007) 104 
 
Table 12 Generating capacity in Britain 
 Generating capacity (GW) 
RWE 10.7 
British Energy 10.7 
E.ON 9.8 
Scottish & Southern 9.3 





Source: DECC (2008)105  
 
The take-over of British Energy 
British Energy was created in 1996 as a privatised electricity generation company to own all 
except the first generation nuclear plants in Britain (excluding the ‘Magnox’ plants). This 
gave them about 10GW of generating capacity comprising 1 PWR and 7 Advanced Gas-
Cooled Reactor stations, each of about 1200MW and comprising 2 reactors. The economics 
of these plants were so poor that the sale price was only £1.7bn, so effectively the plants were 
given away. The company prospered while the wholesale electricity price was high but by 
2002, when the wholesale price was low, British Energy’s income from electricity sales was 
less than its costs and the company collapsed. A rescue plan was brought in by the UK 
government and the company re-launched in 2005 (the plants had continued to operate in the 
interim). This cost taxpayers in the region £10bn.106 
 
Since then, the business has prospered again, but only because of very high energy prices. 
The fundamentals of the business have generally deteriorated significantly. In 2002, when the 
company collapsed, the operating cost of the nuclear plants was about £16/MWh. British 
Energy subsequently acknowledged expenditure on maintenance was less than was necessary 
for the long-term reliability of the plants. Since 2002, when operating costs were at their 
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historic low, costs have risen sharply. In 2007/08, operating costs were £30/MWh compared 
to £27.1/MWh in 2006/07, an increase of 11%, while the realised price was down by 8% 
from £44.2/MWh to £40.7/MWh.107 Output in TWh was the same (54.1TWh) as in the 
previous year but 20% down on 2003/04.108 Half year results can be misleading but for the 
first half of 2008/09, while realised price was somewhat up, operating costs were 
£41.3/MWh, 60% up on the previous comparable period and output was 30% down on the 
previous period.109 
 
While British Energy is hopeful that some of the problems that caused this reduction in 
output can be solved, it is far from clear that, as in the past, new problems to replace them 
will not arise. Of the 7 AGRs, which originally had a licensed life of 30 years, two are 
already more than 30 years old, while three more are about 25 years old and the other two are 
20 years old. Only the PWR, completed in 1995 can confidently be expected to operate for 
more than 10 years into the future. If electricity prices continue to fall from their high point in 
summer 2008, British Energy’s financial position will look precarious. 
 
The ‘price’ for the rescue of British Energy by taxpayers was that the British government was 
effectively given a 67% stake in the company. In 2007, the British government sold about 
half these shares to the market and in 2008, it expressed an interest in disposing of its 
remaining shares but as part of a deal that led to the takeover of the whole company. A 
number of companies expressed an interest but only EDF placed a firm bid. The initial bid 
was rejected but an increased bid of £12.5bn was accepted in September 2008. Exchange 
rates were unstable in the second half of 2008 but at the rates prevailing in September 2008, 
this valued the company at about €15bn.110 
The deal 
The deal was a relatively complicated one because of its size and strategic importance. The 
size of the deal meant that EDF could not pay for British Energy in cash as it had done with 
most previous acquisitions. The company was bought by Lake Acquisitions, a wholly owned 
subsidiary of EDF. EDF said it would finance the deal through a syndicated loan, a revolving 
credit with an average interest rate of 7%, which would provide €13.9 bn. EDF said it would 
provide the rest in cash. An agreement has been made with Centrica that it would take 25% of 
Lake Acquisitions at a cost of £3.1bn111. By January 2009, the deal had not yet been 
completed. Centrica raised £2.2bn from its shareholders through a rights issue and this is 
expected to fund most of the acquisition if the deal is completed.112 
 
From a regulatory point of view, the deal had to be approved by the competition authorities, 
for EDF, the European Commission’s competition authorities. Approval was given in 
December 2008 but on the following conditions: British Energy must sell a 2000MW coal-
fired plant (Eggborough) and EDF must sell an 800MW gas-fired plant (Sutton Bridge).113 
EDF must also agree to sell minimum amounts of electricity in the UK wholesale market, 
dispose of land at either Dungeness or Heysham that could be used to build a new nuclear 
power station, and end one of its three connection agreements with National Grid. The plant 
disposals and the sale of the stake to Centrica would leave EDF with about 10.8GW of 
generating plant, almost the same as its three largest rivals E.ON, RWE and Scottish & 
Southern.114 Centrica would end up with about the same amount of capacity as Scottish 
Power. It is not clear what the implications of selling a certain amount of power to the market 
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would be. Whether the land disposal and the surrendering of a grid connection agreement will 
make other companies more likely to build nuclear plants in UK is far from clear. The 
acquisition by Centrica of 25% of British Energy would also have to clear UK anti-trust 
authorities. 
Rationale 
There were three factors identified by EDF as being behind its decision to take over British 
Energy. First, as the tables show, EDF has much less generating capacity than its competitors, 
and the addition of the British Energy capacity would, as argued above, put EDF on a par, in 
terms of generating capacity with its main rivals. Second, the acquisition gave it ownership of 
all parts of all the main sites where new nuclear power plants could be built in the UK, in 
particular, sites where two new EPRs could readily be accommodated. Third, the highly 
problematic nature of the British Energy plants means British Energy needs a 
disproportionately large staff of skilled nuclear specialists to keep these plants on-line, which 
EDF can accommodate. This represents a useful skill base especially in Anglophone markets, 
such as South Africa and USA.  
 
While these three points have some logic, the deal is far from convincing. The price looks 
very high, especially given that there were no competing bidders and given the deteriorating 
economics of the ageing stock of reactors EDF was taking on. Little would have been lost by 
waiting a year during which lower output and falling electricity price would have been likely 
to significantly reduce the price. EDF argues that it needs to increase its generation to be on 
par with its main rivals, however there is a significant amount of coal and gas-fired plant not 
owned by its rivals it could probably have purchased. 
 
The argument on sites seems no stronger. Of the 7 sites owned by British Energy, two 
(Hunterston and Torness) are in Scotland, which has taken a decision not to allow 
construction of new nuclear plants.115 Hartlepool is not suitable for a new nuclear plant. This 
leaves Heysham, Sizewell, Dungeness and Hinkley Point. However, all these sites, except 
Heysham also house Magnox stations owned by the government’s Nuclear Decommissioning 
Authority (NDA), which would be anxious to gain income from selling the sites. The other 
site mentioned as suitable for twin units, Wylfa, is owned mainly by the NDA. It seems 
inconceivable that the UK government, which since 2006 has always stressed its priority to 
have more than one company building nuclear power plants in Britain would allow any 
company, including EDF, to be prevented from building plants because it did not have access 
to the sites or a grid connection. 
 
3.3.2 Areva in UK 
Areva NP has not been a major supplier to the UK, so it would depend on the companies that 
might build plants in the UK choosing them as supplier. EDF would almost certainly choose 
Areva NP. While E.ON had signed a memorandum of understanding with Areva to use the 
EPR design, it was reported in January 2009 that it had backed away from that commitment. 
RWE is understood to favour the Westinghouse AP-1000, so if E.ON and RWE build plants 
in the UK in collaboration, the AP-1000 may be the more likely reactor choice.116 Iberdrola, 
the Spanish owner of Scottish Power, announced in January 2009 that it might build nuclear 
plants in UK, but it supported the EPR, the ESBWR (now withdrawn) and the AP-1000 in the 
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UK’s generic design assessment,117 so even if it were to enter the UK market, it is far from 
clear that it would order the EPR. 
 
In 2007, Areva NP submitted its EPR design as one of four designs to be considered by the 
UK Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII) for certification in the UK. Of the three other 
designs, the Canadian ACR-1000 and the GE ESBWR were both withdrawn leaving only the 
EPR and the Westinghouse/Toshiba AP-1000. NII has experienced considerable difficulties 
recruiting inspectors and is still some 40 inspectors below its required number. Approval for 
these two designs is not expected before about 2010/11. In December 2008, Areva announced 
agreements with UK firms Balfour Beatty and Rolls Royce and with Vinci (its UK subsidiary 
is Taylor Woodrow) to become suppliers for EPRs.118 If nuclear build does go ahead in the 
UK, it seems likely that EDF will be one of the main players and it would be very surprising 
if EDF was to choose a design other than the Areva EPR. 
 
3.4 USA 
3.4.1 EDF in the USA 
EDF’s first significant entry into the USA was in 2005 through the creation of the Unistar 50-
50 joint venture with the US utility, Constellation. Unistar would build new nuclear plants 
using the EPR design, which, in December 2008, had a target date for certification by the 
NRC of February 2012. Constellation owns about 3.9GW of existing nuclear power plants at 
three sites (Calvert Cliffs, Nine Mile Point and Ginna)119.  
 
In September 2008, EDF tried to take over Constellation but were outbid by MidAmerican 
Energy Holdings, a private company controlled by Warren Buffet. It was reported that the 
rival bid for Constellation could derail their nuclear ambitions in the USA if MidAmerican 
did not support new nuclear build. However, in December 2008, EDF announced an 
agreement with Constellation to take a 49.99% holding in Constellation’s nuclear subsidiary, 
Constellation Energy Nuclear Group. The deal was done through the EDF subsidiary, EDF 
Development Inc, and will cost US$4.5bn.120 Mid American Holdings amicably withdrew its 
offer. The Unistar joint venture will remain separate from this deal. 
 
Whether the purchase of the stake in Constellation’s nuclear assets would make any sense 
without the new build plants is far from clear. However, it is clear that EDF regards it as part 
of its bid to build new plant and expand the scope of its operations into plant design and 
construction. Nucleonics Week reported:  “EDF Chairman/CEO Pierre Gadonneix defended 
the decision to buy what some in France are calling ‘old’ US nuclear plants as a ticket to what 
will be ‘the world's largest nuclear market tomorrow’.”121  
 
The purchase has received a mixed reception with a number of commentators believing that 
EDF had overpaid for assets for which there were no separate accounts.122 The price of 
US$2400/kW seems high for reactors that range from 21-40 years old.123 
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Unistar plans to build EPRs at up to three sites: Calvert Cliffs, Nine Mile Point and a new 
site, Elmore (see below). By December 2008, the US NRC had received and accepted for 
detailed review (docketed) applications for Combined Construction and Operating License 
(COL) for three units of the four units. Each unit is in a different regulatory jurisdiction and 
has unique features so they need to be considered separately. The NRC's review is expected 
to take 36-42 months, and state regulatory review also is required. For loan guarantees, 
utilities were required to make a Part 1 application for funds by September 2008. Part 1 
application has a US$200,000 non-refundable fee. The DOE received Part I applications for a 
total of US$122 billion in guarantees to support 21 new nuclear reactors. The department 
reviewed the Part I applications and gave a priority ranking to each project to help guide 
utilities as to whether to make the Part 2 application, which had to be in by December 2008. 
Part 2 has a US$600,000 non-refundable fee.124 
 
Table 13 Status of Unistar applications 
 NRC Process DOE Loan guarantees 
Nine Mile Point 3, 4 COLA125 submitted Part 1 submitted, part 2 deferred 
Calvert Cliffs 3 COLA submitted Parts 1 & 2 submitted 
Elmore COLA expected Q3 2009 - 
Source: NRC, 2008126 
 
The Calvert Cliffs project is 100% Unistar and is the most advanced of the Unistar projects. It 
is forecast to cost US$7.2bn.127 Unistar ordered forgings and other long lead-time reactor 
components for Calvert Cliffs in 2006 and 2007. A partial COLA, mainly the environmental 
report, was submitted in July 2007 and was docketed by the NRC in January 2008. The 
remainder of the COLA was submitted in March 2008 and was docketed on June 4, 2008. 
The COL could be issued in March 2012. However, Unistar has said it hopes to break ground 
as early as the regulatory process allows, which could be in 2009 and the most optimistic 
completion date is 2015, although this looks very unlikely to be achieved. Part 1 of the 
application for Federal loan guarantees was submitted within the deadlines (September 2008) 
while Unistar expected to submit Part 2 within the deadline of December 2008.128 Further, the 
Nine Mile Point project is also 100% Unistar. The Combined Construction and Licensing 
Application (COLA) for this site was submitted in September 2008 and docketed in 
December 2008. Unistar submitted a Part 1 application for Federal loan guarantees within the 
September 29 2008 DOE deadline, but did not submit Part 2 within the December 2 
deadline.129 A company spokesperson said an application would only be submitted if 
Congress provided more funding. Finally, the Elmore site is still at an early stage of approval 
and a COLA is not expected to be submitted before end 2009. 
 
Overall, of the sites owned by Unistar, only the Calvert Cliffs site seems to have made 
significant progress and incurred major costs for EDF. Constellation has said it will not make 
a final decision on building new plants until “we're satisfied that our expectations have been 
met concerning safety, cost and regulatory support.”130 The US DOE ‘nuclear power 
deployment scorecard’131, updated on January 7, 2009, stated that despite at least 6 years of 
effort, ‘no utility has committed to constructing a new advanced reactor’ under the Nuclear 
2010 programme that President Bush launched in 2002. 
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It is difficult to quantify EDF’s commitment to the US market. The stake in Unistar cost them 
US$4.5bn. It has also provided Constellation with US$600m in liquidity and Constellation 
has an option to sell EDF a stake in some of its non-nuclear assets for US$2bn, so this deal 
may cost EDF more than US$7bn132. The extent of EDF’s financial commitment to Unistar is 
even more difficult to evaluate.  
 
The investment in the USA appears quite speculative. Credit guarantees seem the key for the 
initial orders to be placed. Unless the new Obama administration is prepared to increase its 
offer of credit guarantees from the current figure of US$18.5bn to in excess of about 
US$100bn, any US programme may well be confined to a handful of units.133 Whether orders 
will be possible without credit guarantees is far from clear. If nuclear ordering did not 
resume, EDF’s investment in the USA would have little logic and, as it had to do with 
investments in Brazil and Argentina, they would be sold again, potentially at a significant 
loss. 
 
3.4.2 Areva in the USA 
Areva has also made a significant commitment to the US market. Apart from the reactors that 
Unistar is hoping to build, three other US utilities have chosen the EPR for their plans to 
build nuclear power plants, all using Unistar experience and expertise.  The Bell Bend site is 
a PPL (Pennsylvania Power and Light) project. A COLA was submitted in October 2008 and 
docketed two months later. PPL submitted a Part 2 application for loan guarantees in 
December 2008. AmerenUE has submitted and had docketed a COLA and has applied for 
loan guarantees for a unit at its Callaway site. Amarillo Power has announced its intention to 
build two EPRs but it is not expecting to submit a COLA before the 4th quarter of 2009.134 
 
Areva is seeking US Federal loan guarantees for its planned uranium enrichment plant in 
Idaho. It is competing with two other companies to build enrichment capacity in the USA.135 
The US DOE has set aside US$2bn in loan guarantees to pay for enrichment capacity, which 
may be in short supply within a few years. The Areva plant is expected to cost about US$2bn. 
Regulatory review by the NRC is expected to take about 2-3 years so construction could start 
as early as 2011, with operations commencing in 2014. Areva plans to employ 250 full-time 
workers at the operational site and 1,000 during construction.136 
 
Areva has also announced a joint venture with the US company, Northrop, to build a reactor 
component manufacturing facility in Newport News.137 It would produce reactor vessels, 
steam generators, pressurisers and other large items of equipment. Work is expected to start 
on the facility in the first half of 2009, with completion scheduled for 2011. Areva Newport 
News will then receive forgings from their points of origin (Japan Steel Works (JSW) and 
Creusot Forge in France) and will fabricate the reactor components. The factory is expected 
to cost US$363m and will create about 500 skilled jobs. JSW will supply Areva with large 
forged parts for nuclear power plants until 2016 and beyond under an agreement announced 
by the two companies on November 4 2008 (Areva has also taken 1.3% of JSW’s stock).138 
 
The NRC process represents a significant risk to Areva. The EPR design has received 
certification by the Finnish and French regulators and is undergoing review by the British 
  28
regulator. However, in January 2009, the US design review process was still 3 years from 
completion (longer than the Finnish regulator took), so the NRC is clearly not assuming any 
analysis carried out by other regulators. There is therefore a significant risk that NRC could 
ask for significant design changes, which could raise costs and at worst, could be 
embarrassing for the Finnish and French authorities if they are seen to have approved design 
features that were not acceptable to US regulators. 
 
Overall, Areva has made a major commitment to the US market. Whether the enrichment and 
component manufacturing capacity it is hoping to build would make sense if the US market 
failed to materialise is far from clear. 
 
3.5 China 
3.5.1 Areva in China 
China has, for more than 3 decades, been seen as a major new market for nuclear vendors. In 
practice, this promise has never been realised for two main reasons: nuclear ordering in China 
has consistently been at a much lower level than forecast by the Chinese authorities; and 
China is reluctant to import plants unless technology transfer is part of the deal. It seems to 
prefer to import one or two units with strong technology transfer terms included and then 
build further units without foreign assistance. 
 
Nevertheless, Framatome won orders for two 900MW PWRs (Daya Bay) after a lengthy 
period of negotiations. Construction started in 1987 and was completed in 1994139. China has 
subsequently completed (2 units) or has under construction (9 units) 11 units of essentially 
the same design, without any significant input from Areva. It also bought two units of the 
Candu design (construction start 1998), which the Canadian vendor, AECL hoped would lead 
to further orders, but none has materialised. Similarly, it has completed two units imported 
from Russia (construction start 1999), but again there is no immediate prospect of further 
orders. 
 
Further, China's State Nuclear Power Technology Co ordered 4 AP-1000 plants (at the 
Sanmen and Haiyang sites) in March 2007 from Toshiba/Westinghouse after a tender process 
lasting about 5 years and in competition with Areva’s EPR design. The deal included the 
‘blueprints’ for the design. Construction work is expected to start in 2009. It was reported 
that Areva’s reluctance to transfer technology hampered its bid. Xinhua Financial News 
reported: 
“Stephen Kidd, director of strategy and research at the World Nuclear Association, said that the 
French company lost out to Westinghouse, now owned by Japan's Toshiba, because it was 
unwilling to transfer key technologies and thereby serve Chinese efforts to localize advanced PWR 
technology. "(Areva) wanted to keep the blueprints for their reactor design to themselves," Kidd 
said.” 140 
However, in November 2007, Areva announced a deal to supply 2 EPRs (at the Taishan site) 
to China for completion in 2013/14. Xinhua Financial News reported: 
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“Areva will deliver uranium and other essential products and services for the two reactors until 
2026, according to the French company. It has also agreed to transfer key EPR technologies to the 
China Guangdong Nuclear Power Corporation (CGNPC).” 141 
 
The contract to Areva was reported to be for €8bn covering the nuclear island and the fuel.142 
Other costs, such as on-site costs are substantial but have not been reported so the overall 
forecast cost of the plants is not known. 
 
How far this order represents a change in policy by Areva on technology transfer has not 
been clarified. However, it seems clear that there are highly unlikely to be any follow-up 
orders for either Westinghouse/Toshiba or Areva unless there is a major change in Chinese 
policy. Indeed, Areva might find that Chinese vendors will be competing against them, with 
similar technologies and very competitive prices in international nuclear markets. 
 
3.5.2 EDF in China 
EDF has been involved in nuclear projects in China for more than 25 years. For the Daya Bay 
project, EDF provided project assistance and technical supervision for construction and also 
won some training and service contracts. EDF was also a consultant and contractor for the 
two-unit Ling Ao station between 2002 and 2004. However, its involvement in the EPR deal 
is much more significant. In August 2008, EDF took a 30% stake in a joint venture with 
Guangdong Nuclear Power Holding Company to form a new company, Taishan Nuclear 
Power Company (TNPC), building two EPRs at Taishan, in China's Guangdong province. 
EDF will retain its 30% stake in TNPC for 50 years — the maximum permitted for a joint 
venture in China.143 The order has been valued at €8bn and if EDF takes 30% of this, its 
nuclear investment in China will be at least about €2.5bn.144 
3.6 Other markets 
Areva has been linked to a number of other markets, including South Africa, India and the 
UAE. However, the call for bids the South African utility, Eskom, made in 2008, in which 
Areva NP was competing with Westinghouse/Toshiba was abandoned in December 2008 and 
it is far from clear if and when the competition might be re-opened. This was despite the fact 
that Areva claimed it could have backed 85% of the cost of the plant by export credit 
guarantees. This illustrates the important point that export credit guarantees are of more value 
to the plant vendor, because they ensure they will be paid, than to the utility. Export credit 
guarantees do not prevent the utility going bankrupt, nor do they protect the utility’s credit 
rating. Engineering News reported that the issue was the credit rating of Eskom:145 
‘In fact, ratings agency Standard & Poor’s said on Thursday that South Africa's National Treasury 
needed to extend “unconditional, timely guarantees” across all Eskom's debt stock if it hoped to 
sustain the utility's current BBB+ investment-grade credit rating. The National Treasury was still 
to announce the details of the package.’ 
 
It has been reported that a memorandum of understanding (MOU), including the intention to 
build two EPRs, would be signed in February 2009 between Areva and the state-owned 
Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited.146 Even if this MOU is signed, it is far from 
being a firm order and many MOUs come to nothing, for example, if finance cannot be 
arranged. 
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There has also been speculation about orders for the UAE and some UAE interests have 
spoken about a reactor being on-line by 2017. However, given that the UAE had not set up a 
functional regulatory agency and that there would be political issues that might get in the way 
of orders being placed, this seems hopelessly optimistic.  
4. The market for EPRs 
 
Four EPRs have been sold already (two to China and one each to Finland and France). As 
noted above, the Finnish and the French order have gone badly but, in the case of Olkiluoto, a 
significant proportion of the losses have already been written off, and Areva is not so exposed 
to losses at Flamanville because it is not a turnkey project. 
 
Where might additional sales come from? Plans involving EDF and Areva have been 
announced to build a further 11 units in France, UK and the USA. None of these projects 
have yet been firmly ordered. While there is a strong likelihood that a few EPR orders will be 
placed in France, if life extension for the existing plants is feasible, the market could be no 
more than a handful of units. In France, President Sarkozy has announced that France will 
build a second and third EPR to follow-up EDF’s Flamanville order, the second to be built by 
EDF at its Penly site and the third to be built by GDF Suez at a site yet to be determined.147  
 
In the USA, US utilities have announced plans to build six units of the EPR design.148 
However, there is no certainty that any orders will be placed unless the new US government 
offers loan guarantees. The amount of loan guarantees offered will determine how many of 
the approximately 30 announced projects will actually be built. If significantly more is not 
offered than was planned at the start of 2009, no more than about 4 units will be built. It is 
unclear whether any of these will be EPRs, but only 1 US EPR project is reasonably 
advanced and it is behind several other projects in the queue. 
 
Finally, EDF has stated its intention to order up to 5 EPRs for the UK market.149 In the UK, 
EDF is clearly ahead of its rival utilities in planning nuclear plants, but the sticking point 
might be the UK government’s stated determination not to offer subsidies to new nuclear 
units. If, in 3-4 years time, when design approval has been given and site consent given, EDF 
finds it cannot proceed without subsidies and these are not forthcoming, it may be that no 
orders will be placed. 
 
Beyond these relatively well developed proposals, there are a number of possible markets, 
but all are still speculative. There are utility plans to build another nuclear unit in Finland. 
However, there still has to be political approval won for a new unit and the utility chosen to 
build it (of the three competing) has to choose EPR over competing designs. This seems far 
from certain given the poor experience with Olkiluoto 3. 
 
UAE has made optimistic projections about nuclear capacity, but even if these were to result 
in orders, it is not clear these would go to Areva. Earlier press reports that Areva had been 
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chosen as vendor have proved premature and the UAE has signed a number of co-operation 
agreements with countries other than France and with other vendors. 
 
How quickly the situation in South Africa with regard to Eskom’s credit rating might 
improve is hard to predict, but if the South African government and Eskom believed it was 
just a matter of a year or two, they would surely have put the tender on hold, instead of 
abandoning it. China is a large potential market but all past experience suggests that now 
China has imported 2 EPRs, any further units of that design will be supplied from China. 
 
Other markets are even further off, e.g., Turkey, Brazil, Viet Nam, Canada and Switzerland 
while some, e.g., Germany, Italy, Spain and Belgium would require major political reverses 
that would be politically highly contentious. 
 
Thus, in the next five years, it seems unlikely Areva will win more than a handful of units 
and in the next decade, perhaps 10-15 would be the maximum. Beyond that, a number of 
additional markets could open up and the range of uncertainty is much higher, but past 
experience suggests that the proportion of orders that materialise in comparison with those 
projected is very low. In addition, by then, unless there is a large number of orders for EPR 
that allow its updating, it may well have been rendered obsolescent by newer, more advanced 
designs. 
 
For Areva, the consequences of this uncertainty are not necessarily very serious. If few orders 
are placed, it still has its main business, which is servicing, providing fuel services and spares 
for the existing fleet of reactors. It is unlikely to spend large amounts of money on new 
equipment production facilities until the flow of orders is sufficiently large to clearly warrant 
this investment. 
 
EDF claims the cost-over-run at Flamanville because of the problems suffered in the first 
year of construction are in the order of 20% of the total cost but it is not clear how reliable 
this figure is. EDF’s dominant position in the French electricity market may mean it can still 
pass any losses on to consumers and given that annual sales in France are in excess of €32bn, 
a cost over-run of less than €1bn, spread over several years would have little impact on 
electricity prices even if it was fully passed on to consumers unless the regulator can 





This report examines the financial situations of EDF and Areva and, in particular, what the 
impact of problems at the Olkiluoto and Flamanville nuclear construction sites will be on 
these companies and their shareholders. It looks at how dependent these companies are on the 
achievement of their objective to obtain orders for at least 35 more EPRs in the next decade 
and it examines what part these companies will have in financing these orders. 
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5.1 Public ownership 
 
The ownership of both companies is dominated by the French government and the 
government has consistently used its ownership of these companies as an arm of government 
policy. For example in the 1970s and 1980s, EDF and Areva’s predecessor, Framatome, was 
given whatever resources and backing needed to carry through the government’s nuclear 
ambitions. The French government continues to use these companies as a policy instrument 
and is therefore unlikely to want to lose control of these companies. While there is a 
likelihood that the French government will sell some more EDF shares and that private 
capital will come into Areva, for example through Bouygues, ownership is likely to continue 
to be dominated by the French government. For the foreseeable future, the shareholders of the 
two companies will essentially be the French government, especially after the withdrawal of 
Siemens from Areva NP. The withdrawal of Siemens from Areva NP, apparently because it 
was unable to influence Areva NP’s policies sufficiently will also remove a potential obstacle 
to the French government influencing Areva’s policies to meet its own priorities. However, 
the withdrawal of Siemens from Areva NP does present financial problems because of the 
need to find the capital to buy Siemens out. It remains to be seen whether it will lose 
significant technical expertise and how quickly Siemens can emerge as a major competitor in 
nuclear markets.  
 
Government ownership is a strength and a weakness to both companies. It gives both 
companies huge financial strength and strategic backing in world markets, for example 
through loan guarantees for export orders. However, the French government’s policy 
objectives might not always align with the corporate interests of the two companies. For 
example, the French government could impose restructuring on Areva, such as privatisation, 
merger with Alstom or a partnership with Bouygues, which are not in Areva’s own interests. 
 
5.2 The French market for Areva and EDF 
 
Any plausible cost overruns at Flamanville, which will represent less than 2% of EDF’s 
generating capacity in France, can probably easily be absorbed, while the output is not 
needed to meet French demand so construction time overrun will also have little impact. 
However, it seems implausible that the European Commission will allow EDF to continue to 
have a de facto monopoly in the French electricity market and at least one major competitor, 
probably GDF Suez, is likely to be given or allowed to take a significant proportion of the 
market. What this will mean for the existing nuclear plants is far from clear. Transferring a 
proportion of them to a competitor would be highly contentious and would be fiercely 
resisted, but even if EDF retains these, it seems likely that EDF’s ability to use its French 
customer base to underwrite foreign investments will be reduced. The proposal to extend the 
lives of the existing plants to 60 years probably makes economic sense to EDF. However, if 
the plants were kept in operation for an additional 20 years, the market for EPRs in France 
would be very small and it would make it hard for EDF to retain its capabilities as a nuclear 
plant designer and engineer. 
 
For Areva, it will be difficult for any competitors to make any impression on the French 
market share but even the threat of limited competition could erode Areva’s profit margins. 
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The company’s reprocessing business is likely to shrink unless the trend to plan to dispose of 
spent fuel directly is reversed. EDF will be reluctant to reprocess its spent fuel if, as seems 
likely, direct disposal is cheaper. EDF’s proposal to extend the lives of its existing plants to 
60 years means that the huge replacement market for reactors in France that Areva was 
expecting would dominate its EPR sales is effectively indefinitely postponed and its future 
reactor sales can only be a small proportion of those previously expected. 
 
5.4 Foreign markets 
 
EDF has adopted a new policy in the last year of investing heavily in electric utilities in 
markets where it hopes to build and operate EPRs and it has announced it expects to invest up 
to €50bn in new nuclear power plants worldwide by 2020.150 In the UK and the USA, EDF 
has bought existing nuclear power plants as well as planning to build new ones. It has bought 
British Energy for about €15bn, 49.9% of Constellation’s nuclear assets for about €6bn 
(USA). Its British Energy and Constellation investments have been criticised for being over-
priced. Losses with existing plants can mount up very fast, as was illustrated in the UK in 
2002 when British Energy collapsed alarmingly quickly because the cost of its power fell 
marginally below the market price. If the nuclear markets in USA and UK do not materialise, 
EDF could be left with some very expensive assets of limited value. For China, EDF has 
taken a minority stake in a company building new nuclear plants while its role in South 
Africa, if any, is not yet clear. If the projected sales of EPRs other than those in USA and the 
UK do not materialise, the impact on EDF will probably not be major. It would have acquired 
the resources it would need to fulfil these plans and if the plans do not materialise, it will 
simply not acquire these resources. 
 
Areva is also investing heavily in foreign markets, especially the USA, where it is expecting 
to build major new facilities. For future reactor sales, Areva NP is heavily committed to just 
one reactor design, the EPR, with its other options a long way from commercial application. 
Its projections of reactor sales do not seem realistic and if the manufacturing facilities it is 
building are left under-utilised, this could be costly to them. If the EPR continues to 
encounter technical problems or if the US (or UK) safety regulatory processes throw up 
significant issues, Areva NP will have serious problems remaining a credible reactor vendor, 
especially after its errors with its previous design, the N4. Unless it can salvage the Olkiluoto 
project, which is three years late and at least 50% over-budget, very quickly, the damage to 
its reputation will be severe. Prospective customers will hardly be impressed by a vendor 
locked in a bitter struggle with one of its customers, appearing to try to renege on a turn-key 
contract. 
 
5.5 Finance, debt and credit ratings 
 
Both EDF and Areva have long had a stream of secure business with limited competition that 
dominates their financial position. In the case of EDF, it is the French electricity market, 
where it has an effective monopoly over most sectors of the market. For Areva, there are its 
reactor servicing and fuel supply businesses especially in France where it has had a market 
for the 58 operating reactors with little realistic competition. These large, relatively secure 
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markets are on such a scale that the losses even from major failures such as the Olkiluoto 
project and perhaps the Flamanville project can be absorbed over 3 or 4 years with relatively 
little impact on their overall profits. They have also allowed the companies to take on 
relatively risky investments, such as EDF’s investments in South America secure in the 
knowledge that these would be underwritten by their core businesses. However, both 
companies appear to be moving in to a period where these secure businesses will become 
more risky. This comes at a time when their strategic plans call for major investments, which 
will tend to significantly increase their debt levels, perhaps putting their high credit rating at 
risk. Both companies have said they want to sell existing businesses to keep their 
indebtedness under control, but whether they can find businesses to sell that will not damage 
their corporate prospects and will raise enough money to achieve this remains to be seen. A 
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